Thursday, 20 November 2014

SNIPER INDONESIA



The greatness of Kopassus is they do not hesitate to ask for assistance from other parties who are considered expert in their field such as PADI diving, Aves for skydiving, mountain climbing etc. Wanadri for. made the trip, then will they modify themselves for combat purposes and instead become more intense.

As a unit they have the Hub Department (of Transportation) itself is very sophisticated and has a transportation system that is self-contained and portable Satellite Mobile Phonet, Kes (Health) itself, Pal (Tools) themselves with sophisticated weaponry, Bek (Supplies) alone, Ang (Transportation) alone, with Hummer cars, cars etc. shore.

In fact, they are planning to buy their own helicopters from Russia (but failed due to the Financial Crisis). So in principle they are very independent, including having a number of armored vehicles.
Conclusion & Excellence

Five Japanese Weapons of War China Should Fear


Sino-Japanese relations have been deteriorating since 2010. What started as a dust-up over a Chinese fisherman arrested for fishing in Japanese waters has escalated into a series of unpleasant incidents between the two countries, mostly in and around the uninhabited, and largely unappealing Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in China.)
For now, incidents have largely been restricted to demonstrations by the coast guards of both sides and military aircraft encounters. Yet with each year, relations between China and Japan have steadily deteriorated. Unchecked, someday what may seem like routine unpleasantness could spiral into military action. Listed below for your consideration are five Japanese weapons of war that Beijing should think carefully about if the unthinkable ever occurred:
Soryu-class Diesel Electric Submarines
Japan’s Soryu-class submarines are some of the most advanced non-nuclear attack submarines in the world. Displacing 4,100 tons submerged, the subs can make 13 knots on the surface and up to 20 knots submerged. Four Stirling air independent propulsion systems allow the Soryu class to remain underwater far longer than most diesel electric submarines.
The Soryu class is armed with six bow-mounted torpedo tubes, with a total of 20 Type 89 high-speed homing torpedoes and American-made Sub-Harpoon missiles. Japan’s submarines could also be the delivery vehicles for cruise missiles, should the concept of preemptive strikes, currently being debated in Japanese politics, become a reality.
There are currently eight Soryu-class submarines, with more under construction. In response to increased tensions with China and a growing People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine fleet, in 2010 Japan decided to increase its own submarine force from 16 to 22.
Japan’s postwar submarine doctrine concentrates submarines at a number of key invasion routes to Japan: the Tsugaru Strait, Tsushima Strait, Kanmon Strait, and the Soya Strait. This concentration is a Cold War holdover, from when Japan expected that Soviet Union might invade during wartime. A more China-centric deployment plan, especially with the Senkakus and Ryukyu islands in mind, could see more forward deployments into the East China Sea and Sea of Japan.
Japan’s submarine fleet is particularly worrisome to China because of Beijing’s traditional weakness in anti-submarine warfare (ASW). China has not practiced ASW in wartime and has been institutionally deficient in both skills and assets. Japan, on the other hand, has operated submarines for many decades. Japanese submarine crews are reportedly well trained, on par with their American counterparts.

The Bear Awakens: Russia's Military Is Back

One of the distinguishing characteristics of Vladimir Putin’s presidency has been his commitment to revitalizing Russia’s military. Putin, who has noted that Russia’s perceived weakness makes it vulnerable to external pressure and internal disruption, is pushing for increased funding to transform the Russian armed forces from the debilitated remnants inherited from the old Soviet superpower military machine into a smaller, but more modern, mobile, technologically advanced and capable twenty-first century force.
In 2013, in an address delivered on the day devoted to the “defenders of the Fatherland,” the Russian president proclaimed: “Ensuring Russia has a reliable military force is the priority of our state policy. Unfortunately, the present world is far from being peaceful and safe. Long obsolete conflicts are being joined by new, but no less difficult, ones. Instability is growing in vast regions of the world.”
This is not empty talk. The rhetoric has been matched by a concurrent allocation of resources; Russia is now engaged in its largest military buildup since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than two decades ago, with major increases in defense spending budgeted each year to 2020. Putin has pushed for this program even over the objections of some within the Kremlin who worried about costs and the possible negative impact on Russian prosperity; opposition to the expansion of military spending was one of the reasons the long-serving Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin left the cabinet several years ago.
The rest of the world is taking notice.
After years of thinking of Russia as “Upper Volta with missiles”—a nation which possessed a sizeable strategic nuclear stockpile but whose conventional forces had not particularly covered themselves with glory in their post-Soviet operations—Russian plans for military reform and rearmament have generated some concern, particularly in the U.S. national-security establishment, which had assumed that Russia would not be in a position to project much power across its borders. The resumption of bomber patrols in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the dispatch of task forces (particularly to the Caribbean), the 2008 campaign against Georgia, and the growing size and sophistication of the yearly joint maneuvers with the Chinese army and navy have all worked to resurrect the image of Russia as a military threat. Justification for U.S. defense expenditures, which previously focused largely on increases in Chinese spending, now take into account Russia’s military buildup as well.